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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
L1 tah State Insurance Fund is joining the plaintiff's

T~,,

a:_ Lc•l, sePking review of an order of the Industrial Commission
-f lt3·1 ado;•ting the findings of the medical panel which denied

,,

Worker's Compensation benefits.

~c;es

DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
f,n initial hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge
_t'-,

at 8:30 a.m.

<,c,1,,,
1

-•12t1ve Law
11

1

Jud~e

on May 3, 1982.

At that time, the

appointed a medical panel to review

ssut"s ir, the case.

The medical panel determined

-_,,,. industrial accident on November 5, 1979 did not
J+

in

~n·

permanent partial impairment to Moyes.

filed Objections to the Medical Panel Rericn t

A further hear1n,,

on Objections to the Medical Fanel Report was held before
Administrative Law Judge Keith Sohm at 2:00 o.m. on September

10, 1982.

Subsequent to the hearing,

the Administrative Law

Judge adopted the findings of the medical panel that the
November 5, 1979 industrial accident did not result in a
rateable permanent partial impairment to Moyes.

The Adminis-

trative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order on October 27, 1982.

On November 15, 1982

Moyes, the State of Utah and/or the State Insurance Fund filed
a Motion for Review challenging the Administrative Law Judge's
adoption of the medical

pa~el

report.

On April 26, 1983, the

Industrial Commission denied plaintiffs' Motion for Review.
RELIEF SOl'GH':' 0!1 APPEAL
The State of Utah and/or the Utah State Insurance Fund have
joined this appeal asking for a reversal of the Industrial
Commission's finding that Moyes' November 5, 1979 industrial
accident did not result in a rateable permanent partial impairment.

The Utah State Insurance Fund has paid out considerable

amounts of money for medical expenses and cornrensation since
the accident.

The finding of the Commission that the accident

did not result in a rateable permanent !)art:Cal impairme:nt
effectively denies the State Insurance Puna reimbursement from

-2-

,,.1 Tn iury Fund in a case where the applicant had suffered
.• ns1,•e pre-existing conditions for a long period of time.
Cude Ann., § 35-1-69

(Supp. 1981), which provides for reim-

Lursernent from the Second Injury Fund, requires that a permanent
parual impairment result from an industrial accident before
reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund can be ordered.

A

new order should be entered by the Cormnission rating the permanent
partial disability due to the industrial accident and the permanent
partial disability due to pre-existing conditions.

The Utah State

fosurance Fund should be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund
for a proportion of the expenses and compensation it has paid
out equal to the percentage of permanent partial impairment due
to pre-existing conditions.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Moyes had a long and tragic medical history.

He

suffered from neck problems, heart problems, arthritis, back
problems, and numerous other health problems.

In October, 1983,

Mr. Moyes passed away as a result of unrelated medical problems.
Tn1s Court granted Mrs. Shirley Moyes, widow of H. Jack Moyes, the

right to be substituted as a party.
M•>yes had been involved in at least four work-related
1Jents
.-1
1

involving injuries to his lower back.

The first

.-irrurred in 1967, when Moyes, then employed by IBEC

Truck,

strained his lower back while changing a tire (R. 26).
-3-

This injury caused him to lose a few days of work

(R.

26).

The

other three accidents occurred while Moyes was employed by the
State Department of Finance.

In 1973, Mnyes slipped on sone

ice and snow at work and fell against a wall, twisting his back
(R. 24).

He received no compensation for this accident and had

only a minimal amount of time off from work.
injured his back while moving a desk.

In 1976 Moyes

He lost some time from

work from this injury and received some temporary total disability
compensation from the State Insurance Fund; however, Moyes
received absolutely no compensation for permanent partial
impairment or even a permanent impairment rating for any of
these previous injuries or conditions

(R.

24-25).

On November

5, 1979, Moyes fell on the Capitol steps, injuring his back
(R. 15).

This accident is the subject matter of this

litigation.
Early in the morning of November 5, 1979, Moyes left
his office to check on his car

(R. 15).

On the way to his

car, he fell down the Capitol steps, twisting his back

(R. 15).

Moyes did not seek immediate medical attention because he had
a doctor appointment in early December

(R. 16).

During the

day the pain in his lower back grew steadily worse, forcing
him to leave work in the early afternoon

(R. 16).

During

the following month his pain grew increasinyl 0· worse

(R.

17).

When Mr. Moyes saw his physician, Dr. Thomas Noonan, in
December, he was advised that surqery would be approoriate
-4-

(R. i -

,c

~runitted

to the hospital on January 6, 1980 (R. 17).

On

1970, a myelograrn was performed on his back which

\J\o

at~d

that he had a herniated disc with significant protrusion

10 7) •

On January 8, 1980, Dr. Noonan operated on Moyes' lower

back (R. 19).

Dr. Noonan performed a second operation on Moyes'

back in December, 1980 (R. 20).

In November of 1981, Dr. Noonan

referred Mr. Moyes to Dr. Morrow (R. 20).

At this time, Dr.

Morrow injected a narcotic into the spine to relieve the pain
(R. 20).

Later that month, Dr. Morrow operated on Moyes' back

(R. 20).

None of these surgeries was contemplated or planned

prior to Moyes' slip and fall on November 5, 1979.
The medical issues of this case were referred to a medical
panel consisting of Dr. Frank Dituri and Dr. Edward Spencer (R.
58-59).

Neither doctor reviewed all of the medical records of

thP treating physicians, Dr. Noonan and Dr. Morrow (R. 59-61).
F8r example, neither Dr. Dituri nor Dr. Spencer reviewed the
x-rays taken prior to the 1979 injury (R. 60).

Further, neither

Dr. Dituri nor Dr. Spencer reviewed the myelograrn which was
performed on January 8, 1980 (R. 61).

Nevertheless, the

medical panel concluded that none of Mr. Moyes' impairment was
due to the accident of November 5, 1979, and that all of his
Jnwcr back problems were the result of long years of a chronic
Jc·Jc nerative disease
0

(R. 116).

Dr. Morrow, on the other hand,

·, 1t1~J and stated in his records that Moyes suffered from
l't~

permanent partial impairment of the whole man to the back,
-5-

5% of which is attributable to the November S
(R. 98), and 5% of which is attributable to pre-existing
conditions.
Under Dr. Morrow's analysis, the State of Utah and/or the
Utah State Insurance Fund is entitled to a 50% reimbursement
from the Second Injury Fund for all medical, temporary total
disability and permanent partial impairment benefits paid or
due and owing Mr. Moyes that accrued by the date of his death.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER SHIRLEY MOYES MAY PROSECUTE THIS
APPEAL FOR BENEFITS WHICH WOULD HAVE ACCRUED
PRIOR TO THE DATE OF H. JACK MOYES' DEATH.
Appellants State of Utah and/or Utah State Insurance Fund
concur and adopt by reference the position of petitioner Shirle;
Moyes regarding her right to accrued benefits due and owina her
husband as of the date of his death

(see Argument, Point I of

petitioner Moyes' brief).

THE ADMINISTRr>.TIVE LAW JUDGE AND THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY A~W CAPRICIOL'SLY
IN ACCEPTING THI: MI:DICAL PANEL DETERMil1ATIOtJ,
BASED ON AN INCOMPLETE AND WHOLLY I'lhDEQL'.;TI:
REVIEI\ OF THE MEDICAL E\'IDE:lCE, T!F'T MOYES DID
NOT INCUR PEPc'1A:1E:17 PARTIAL IMP!\IRME:n' AS A
RESULT OF THE NOVEMBI:R S, 19 7 9 ACC I DE'.'7.
-6-

''" 1lca1 pane 1 in this case determined that the industrial
i,.,,r ,_,f November 5,

1979 did not result in a rateable

perinanent partial impairment.

The panel stated:

It is the opinion of the panel that no part
of this is due to the industrial injury of
November 5, 1979.
After carefully reviewing
all the records and taking a careful history
from Mr. Moyes, it is our opinion that his
low back problems are a result of long years
of chronic degenerative disease.
We do not
feel that the injury in November of 1979,
for which he did not see a doctor and for
which he did not take off work, caused any
serious increase in the impairment.
We do
not believe that the surgery done in January
of 1980 was a result of the injury but was
a result of the progression of a pre-existing
disease (R. 116).
This opinion is misleading.

First, it is not true that

Mr. Mo1es did not miss any work due to his fall on November 5,
1 979.

An examination of the record indicates that he missed some

work:

Q.
Did you return to work during that period
of November 5 to December?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You lost no time off work?

A.
Yes, I took off that afternoon the date
it happened because I was hurting, and I may
have missed a day or two between, but I don't
really know.
I am not sure {R. 16-17).
:;, c·

ndlj', Moyes did see his doctor.
,J

He merely waited a few

his regularly scheduled appointment.
-7-

The me!'lbers of

the medical panel relied heavily upon tr1e fa:1

that Mr. Mr,:,es

did not see a doctor immediately to determine that the Novenl•er
5, 1979 accident did not result in permanent partial impairment
and was not the reason Moyes required surgery in January and
December of 1980.

Apparently the panel felt that if the Novernbec-

5, 1979 accident resulted in a rateable permanent partial impairment and necessitated the 1980 surgeries, then Mr. Moyes would
have been in such severe pain that he would have immediately
contacted his physician.

The November 1979 accident did cause

Mr. Moyes a great deal of pain.

He testified that the pain

worse between November and December of 1979.

gre~

The fact that Mo::es,

a man with a long history of medical problems, did not immec1iate:
contact a doctor is not necessarily indicative of a lack of

pai~.

Dr. Dituri, chairman of the panel, admitted at the hearing on
Objections to the Medical Panel Report that Moyes might be more
tolerant of back pain than other human beings:
Q.
But you would agree with me, would you
not, that it would be reasonable to assume
any person with a 12-year history of back
problems, who had been working during that
12-year period, might be more tolerant of
back pain, and work with that condition.
A.

Yes sir

(R.

83).

However, the panel apparently did not consider that plaintiff's
long history of back problems, not an abscr.ce of pair,,
plaintiff's short delay in contacting a physician.
-8-

exolair:~c

f

1·,ally, the conclusion of the medical panel is misleading
stntes

11

•

. after carefully reviewing all the records

Indeed, neither Dr. Dituri nor Dr. Spencer reviewed all

Gt the medical records in this case.
r lie x-rays

accident

Neither of them reviewed

taken of plaintiff's lower back prior to the 1979

(R.

60).

Furthermore, neither of them reviewed the

m0 elogram taken of plaintiff's back on January 7, 1980 prior to
sJrgery

(R.

61).

One of plaintiff's examining physicians, Dr. Morrow, testified
and stated in his records and reports that there is a medically
demc·nstrable connection between the industrial injury of November
5, 1979 and the protrusion along plaintiff's spine which required
surgery in January of 1980.

Dr. Morrow's findings were based

on a more extensive review of the records, including the
m,·el0gran and the x-rays taken of plaintiff's back prior
tc the 1979 injury

(R.

98).

Prior to the January 1980 surgery, Moyes had a moderately
large herniated disc in the lower part of his back.

This

prctrusion was discoverable through the myelogram taken on
January 7, 1980.
t

Dr. Morrow testified that it was consistent

·1at the type of injury Moyes sustained in November of 1979 would

1

rause a large herniated disc:

. also it's quite consistent that an injury
of that sort would cause a moderately large
herniated disc.
-9-

If it were simply a deoenPrat1ve d1sr,
we would not see a significant prnt1us1,,n.
We might see just a small gentle bulge,
from which it does not yield much disc
material when it's opened, as described
this did (R. 100-101).
Perhaps had the medical panel reviewed the myelogram taken
on January 7, 1980, they would have been aware that Moyes
suffered from a large protrusion in his lower back which was
medically probably not merely the result of a degenerative
disease, but the result of the traumatic incident of November
5, 1979.
POINT III
THE ACCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 5, 1979 RESULTED
IN A RATEABLE PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY;
THEREFORE THE STATE OF UTAH A:'D/OR THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND FOR
A SHARE OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION.
This Court's interpretation of

§

35-1-69 has consistently

allowed contribution from the Second Injury Fund for all types
of Worker's Compensation payments in an amount equal to the
percentage of permanent partial disability attributable to any
pre-existing condition.
551 P.2d 504

McPhie v. United States Steel Corp.,

(Utah 1976); Intermountain Health, Inc. v. Orteoa,

562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); White v. Industrial Commission, 604 P.;'
478 (Utah 1979); Intermountain Smelting Corp. \". Capitano, 610 P ..
334

(Utah 1980); Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, 656 P.2d 410

1982); United States Fidelity
Commission, 647 P.2d 754

&

Guaranty Co. v. Industrial

(Utah 1983).
-10-

(Uta·

, ,., Inte_rmountain Health Care, this Court held that § 35-1-69
~,roportionate
-e·_,,,,,J

contribution from the Special Fund (the

InJury Fund) for compensation and medical benefits in

eses involving pre-existing injuries.
~·

In Intermountain Health

the Conunission found that the claimant had a permanent

pdrt1al disability of 30%, 10% attributable to a pre-existing
f.Jsychological condition and 20% attributable to an accident which
occurred on the job.

The Conunission failed, however, to require

the Second Injury Fund to pay its proportionate share of the
worker's Compensation benefits.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme

Court found that § 35-1-69 required the Second Injury Fund to
reimburse the insurance carrier for one-third of the medical
expenses and compensation because one-third of the employee's
permanent partial disability was attributable to her pre-existing
rorid1tion.
In the instant case, the November 5, 1979 accident resulted
in permanent partial impairment as determined by Mr. Moyes'
treating physician, Dr. Morrow.

Dr. Morrow found the applicant

suffered from a 10% permanent partial impairment due to his lower
back condition, 5% of which was directly attributable to the
industrial accident of November 5, 1979 and 5% of which was due
t•' f re-existing conditions.
1

is

· Lllgated

~ctage of
I,·.

Therefore, the Second Injury Fund

to reimburse the State Insurance Fund for a
the temporary total compensation and medical

rid1ts which the State Insurance Fund has paid to the
-ll-

applicant equal to the percentage of the permanent partial
disability attributable to applicant's many pre-existing
conditions.
In the case of White v. Industrial Commission, 604 P.2d
478 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that the Second
Injury Fund must reimburse the insurance carrier for a
proportion of medical expenses and temporary total disability
compensation equal to the percentage of permanent partial
disability applicable to the pre-existing injury.
In the instant case, the State Insurance Fund has paid
out a substantial amount of benefits in the form of medical
expenses and temporary total disability.

The State Insurance

Fund should be reimbursed for that portion of the medical
expenses and the temporary total compensation equal to the
percentage of the impairment due to the applicant's pre-existinc
injury.
In Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d
334

(Utah 1980), this Court again held that the Commission

erred in ordering the employer to pay all medical compensation
and temporary total disability benefits when a portion of the
disability was attributable to a pre-existing injury.
that case, the Court stated:
-12-

In

w,, think thal the reasonable conclusion to be

dr,11,'n therc,fro"1 is that the employer is
1 ''S!"·nsihlc for
only the percentage of compen"'it i r111 and medical care which the injury occurring
in th cmr,lrJ';ment bears to the applicant's
t0lal disability.
This conclusion is also
borne out by the final provision that any
am0unt which has been paid by the employer
in excess of the portion attributable to said
industrial injury shall be reimbursed to him
out of the Special Fund.
0

Id.

ilt

337.

POINT IV
THE STATE OF UTAH AND/OR THE UTAH STATE INSURANCE
FUND IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE
SECOND INJURY FUND ON A 71/76THS RATIO.
The State of Utah and/or the Utah State Insurance Fund urge
this Court to remand this matter to the Industrial Commission for
0ntry of an order sustaining the position espoused herein.
1s

It

these plaintiff-appellants' position that they are entitled

to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund on a 71/76ths ratio.
The basis for this position is the medical panel report and the
opinion expressed by Dr. Robert E. Morrow, one of the treating
ph~ 1 s1

cians.

In respect to the applicant's pre-existing conditions,
the medical panel stated the following:
DIAGNOSIS AND DISCUSSION
Assuming but not deciding that the applicant
was involved in the events as alleged, the
panel finds him to have significant impairment
in many areas.
First of all, it should be
noted that he has a problem of chronic alcoholism
with alcoholic liver disease.
He also has severe,
ch10nic obstructive pulmonary disease consistent
with his history of heavy smoking.
It is our
-13-

opinion

tl:.,1t

h,-,

}:de;

s 1,1r11 ti,· 11',t

disease w11h i11tc:r1111ttl_'J)t
a 1 so h c=i_ s art er i e._• s '---. 1 ·:- 1 ' , t i , - h (·

post-bypass

surqerj·,

1,,.,r1 tit

r

l\

11

1·~rn\','l.SC111,11

1uliJ.·,1t1c)n.
l ·1

a11t11

t

n.i

c1 i

~' 1 , as,

,

r1,,

1}c·1·Lo1· 1 s .

In addition, he has de']>'J<t'LJt1vv arthritis of
the spine anJ is status JH•'.;t-fusion of the
cervical spine and status post-diskectomy of
the lumLar spine.
If we rate all these separate medical problems
using the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment of the American Medical Association .
we find that his chronic alcoholism rates as
5 per cent permanent partial impairment of the
whole man.
His alcoholic liver disease rates as
15 per cent permanent partial impairment of the
whole man.
His chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease rates as 35 per cent impairment of the
whole man.
His peripherovascular disease with
intermittent claudication rates as 5 per cent
permanent partial impairment.
I:is arteriosclerotic heart disease with angina pectoris rates
as 40 per cent.
The degenerative disease of the
cervical spine, status post-diskectomy and
fusion, rates as 10 per cent and the status
post-diskectomy of the lumbar spine rates as
another 10 per cent.
When all of these are
combined using the Combined Values Scale, we
find that Mr. Moyes has a permanent partial
impairment of 76 per cent of the whole body.
As was stated above, Dr. Morrow agreed with the medical
panel chairman, Dr. Dituri, regarding Moyes'
partial impairment due to the lower back.

10% permanent

However, Dr.

Morrow disagreed with Dr. Dituri in that he found Si of it
was due to the industrial accident.
Plaintiffs-appellants did nol contest the medical panel's
opinion regarding the pre-exist in•J cnnrl1
assessment that all of the

imr~airm•?nt

- 14-

of

t

ions other than the
t.

h(· lower hack wc1s

,,,

pre-existing condition; therefore the ratings given

th~
1 • -"

,.=-1 when combined with Dr. Morrow's substantiated

d<"monstrate Moyes had a 76% permanent partial impairmcnt:. 5% of which was due to the industrial accident of November

s,

J97~

and 71% of which was due to pre-existing conditions.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69, the Industrial
comm1 ssion on remand should order the Second Injury Fund to
reimburse the State Insurance Fund on a 71/76ths ratio or for
93% of the medical benefits and temporary total disability
compensation paid.
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial
Cc·nunission, 657 P.2d 764
35-1-69.

(Utah 1983), this Court interpreted

Though that case involved several statutes and

a fairly complicated fact situation, the Court did discuss

the implication and purpose of § 35-1-69:
Explicit statutory authority exists to
apportion compensation awards and medical
costs between the employers and the Second
Injury Fund, provided pertientn conditions
are met.
Basically those conditions are
three in number:
(1) permanent incapacity
occasioned by accidental injury, disease or
congenital causes, followed by (2) subsequent
injury resulting in further permanent incapacity
which is:
(3) substantially greater than that
which would have been incurred if there had
been pre-existing incapacity. Those conditions
having been met, the liability of the employer
is assessed on "the basis of the percentage of
permanent physical impairment attributable to
the industrial injury only and the remainder
shall be paid out of the said special (second
inJury) fund."
ldo

at 767.

-15-

In the instant case, the State Insurance Fund has paid
temporary total disability and medical exe>crises due to the
November 5, 1979 accident and the resulting surgical and
non-surgical procedures performed upon the apµlicant in
1980.

This Court should find, based on the substantial weight

of the evidence presented, that the November 5, 1979 injury
resulted in a rateable permanent partial disability, the State
Insurance Fund should be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund
for a portion of the expenses it has paid out equal to the
percentage of disability attributable to pre-existing injuries.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily and

capriciousl~

in adopting the medical panel's conclusion that plaintiff's
November 5, 1979 industrial accident did not result in a
rateable permanent partial impairment.
relied on incomplete evidence.

The medical panel

Plaintiff's treating physician,

based upon an examination of the entire medical record, testifies
and reported the November 5, 1979 accident resulted in a rateab'.c
permanent partial impairment of 5% of the whole man to the back.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which the Industrial
Commission affirmed, accepted the report of the medical panel
and rejected the report of the attending physician without
giving any reasons therefor.

Thus, the determination of the

Industrial Commission was arbitrary and capricious, and t'ie
denial of the Motion for Review should be reversed.
-16-

The appellant, State Insurance Fund, respectfully requests
"rt to remand this case to the Industrial Commission so
, '" >'

can enter an order requiring the Second Injury Fund

-~1n~urse
0 ,-,

3

the appellants for 93% of the benefits paid based

71/76ths ratio.
Respectfully submitted this

~day

of March, 1984.

BLACK & MOORE

g

'-'§. ~Cl

.J 1 1> .IM(L
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